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This project uses data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine, in the 
context of a structural retirement model, the effects on retirement of non-wage aspects of 
employment emanating from firm side factors.  Factors examined include minimum 
hours constraints, layoffs, physical and mental requirements of the job, informal 
pressures to retire, accommodations made by the employer when a person has a health 
problem, and retirement windows.  The most important effects found pertain to minimum 
hours constraints. Should minimum hours constraints be abolished, the percent of the 
population ages 62 to 69 who are completely retired will decline by 10 to 15 percentage 
points.  The fraction in this age group who are working in partial retirement jobs will 
increase by roughly twenty percentage points of the population.  Were minimum hours 
constraints abolished, more than twice as many people would enter partial retirement as 
would leave full time work. As a result, total FTE employment would increase were 
minimum hours constraints eliminated.  Increasing the importance of partial retirement 
would affect the role of the earnings test and liquidity of the Social Security system, 
although the increase in partial retirement would be largely, but not entirely offset by the 






This paper was supported by a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) 
to the Michigan Retirement Research Center, UM 03-03.  The opinions and conclusions 
are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or 
policy of SSA, the Michigan Retirement Research Center, or the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Alan L. Gustman is Loren Berry Professor of Economics at 
Dartmouth College, Department of Economics, Hanover, N.H. 03755 
(alan.l.gustman@dartmouth.edu).  Thomas L. Steinmeier is Professor of Economics, 
Texas Tech University, Department of Economics, Lubbock, Texas 79409 
(Thomas.Steinmeier@TTU.edu).  As the baby boomers retire, the demand for older workers will increase.  As a result, 
firms will relax the conditions that have encouraged early retirement on long term jobs held by 
older workers.  This project examines the effects on retirement of non-wage aspects of 
employment emanating from firm side factors, including minimum hours constraints, layoffs, 
physical and mental requirements of the job, informal pressures to retire, accommodations made 
by the employer when a person has a health problem, and retirement windows.  Accordingly, if 
these factors change with changing labor market conditions, we will be in a position to predict 
the effect of such changes on retirement outcomes.  By understanding the effects of these factors 
on retirement, and how soon to be realized changes in these factors will affect retirement, we can 
draw direct implications for Social Security.  Specifically, we can determine the extent to which 
changes in these non-wage aspects of employment that firms might adopt to encourage longer 
work lives will lead to postponed retirement, and thus will reduce pressure on the Social Security 
system.   
Six factors are examined: indicators of physical and mental difficulty of work; the role of 
minimum hours constraints; job accommodations to those with a limitation on their ability to 
work; age discrimination as perceived by the worker; layoffs; and early retirement windows. 
Two lines of analysis are attempted.  One line of analysis focuses on proper specification.  
How important is it that certain factors, normally omitted from structural retirement models, be 
included in the model?  Do the indicated factors significantly affect retirement outcomes?  
Second, we run a number of simulations asking what would happen to retirement outcomes if we 
were relax the influence of a number of demand side factors.   
Section II examines the role of demand side factors in retirement studies.  The basic 
retirement model is presented in Section III.  Section IV describes the data and Section V the 
   1basic estimates of the parameters of the structural model.  Section VI examines the role of job 
conditions in the preference function.  Simulations of the effects of relaxing a number of 
constraints and job conditions are presented in Section VIII.  Section VIII concludes. 
II. The Potential Importance of Non-wage Demand Side Factors in Retirement Analysis   
Non-wage aspects of employment are important determinants of how people value their 
jobs.  Accordingly, they may affect employment choices, including the decision to retire.  When 
these constraints are ignored, and hours of work or retirement status are assumed to be related 
only to incentives from the wage and fringe benefits, in particular Social Security and pensions, 
the findings in studies of retirement (and saving) may potentially be subject to serious omitted 
variable bias.  
Physical and mental demands of the job come immediately to mind.  Early data from the 
Retirement History Study (RHS) clearly suggested that conditional on wages and pensions, 
workers in blue collar jobs preferred to retire earlier (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986b).  
Although those in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) cohort – those born from 1931 to 
1941 in the HRS sample -- disproportionately hold union and manufacturing jobs when 
compared to those in younger cohorts (Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier, 1995), physically 
demanding jobs are less common for those verging on retirement today than they were in the 
past.  Both the physical difficulty of work and the challenges to keep up are measured in the 
HRS, allowing us to standardize more completely for job features than we could in our previous 
work.   
  A minimum hours constraint is among the most important of the features of the 
opportunity set shaping the retirement choice. 
1  Hours constraints limit individuals’ employment 
                                                           
1 The role of minimum hours constraints in shaping retirement behavior was a major 
theme in our work of two decades ago modeling retirement.  (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1983, 
   2choices as they approach retirement from jobs held for a long period of time.  Theory tells us that 
in the absence of any constraints, as they age, most people would prefer to gradually reduce their 
time at work.  Moreover, given the higher wage paid on jobs held for a long time, they would 
prefer to partially retire on long term jobs.  As a result of the minimum hours constraint, 
however, they are not free to do so.  Rather, many firms require full-time work on a main job, or 
none at all.  Consequently, the predominant retirement path is from full time work to complete 
retirement, with a significant fraction, but a minority, passing through partial retirement 
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984a, 2000c).    
As it becomes more difficult to meet the physical demands of work with increasing age, 
or with the incidence of some health problem, some employers may accommodate by allowing 
changes in job tasks, while others may make no accommodation.  Moreover, certain jobs are by 
their nature more accommodating, allowing greater autonomy, providing flexibility, and in other 
ways promoting a work environment that is more favorable to older individuals.  An extreme 
form of accommodation to older workers is flexibility of hours. Job reassignment may also help 
to prolong the productive work-life of an older employee.  This may be especially important for 
individuals who have experienced health changes that make it more difficult for them to perform 
their jobs.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1984b) demonstrated the extent of minimum hours constraints facing retirement age workers.  
Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a) demonstrated the importance of including minimum hours 
constraints in retirement models.  Since these constraints are the reason most workers proceed 
directly from full time work to complete retirement, a model that assumes workers are free to 
work part time on their main job, but choose not to, will conclude that there is little convexity to 
the indifference curves between income and leisure in any period.  Rather, as did Gordon and 
Blinder (1980) in their otherwise pioneering study, they will conclude that work and leisure 
choices involve corner solutions, where retirement most individuals flip from the corner with full 
time work to the corner with full retirement.   
 
   3Informal pressures on jobs from both employers and colleagues aimed at older workers 
encourage older individuals to leave the firm.  By affecting job satisfaction, these pressures may 
encourage earlier leaving even if the wage offer is not lowered.   
Another issue is that a person’s employment choices may be constrained by involuntary 
termination of employment on a long term job, e.g., through layoff.
2   
Early retirement windows are another important feature of the opportunity set that is 
often ignored in retirement models (see, however, Brown, 2000).  One time or periodic changes 
in retirement rules in the form of window plans may encourage early retirement.  These rule 
changes may enhance the value of the pension by crediting more years of work, by relaxing the 
early retirement age, by providing retiree health insurance, or by enhancing the reward to earlier 
retirement in other ways.   
  Many studies have considered the effects of one or another of these firm side forces when 
analyzing retirement behavior.  Hurd (1996) provides an excellent summary.  Some of these 
constraints have been examined in reduced form studies.
3  Our contribution will be to consider 
their effects in the context of a structural model of retirement and saving.   
                                                           
2 Involuntary separations are distinguished from voluntary retirements.  In our earlier 
work, we recognized that separations due to mandatory retirement should not be treated as 
voluntary retirement, and thus distinguished those who were forced to leave the firm at the 
mandatory retirement age (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986a).  Having been outlawed for all but 
top level executives and those in certain other jobs, mandatory retirement is not an issue today.  
But layoffs, to the extent they are involuntary, raise the same problems.  Recently, Chan and 
Stevens (2001) have examined the effects of layoffs in the Health and Retirement Study.  In 
contrast to the present study, their analysis is reduced form. 
 
3 Haider and Loughran (2001) find that the proportion of older workers who report their 
job requires lifting heavy loads, stooping, kneeling or crouching, and good eyesight declines with 
age between 50 and 79.  These findings are consistent with earlier findings that certain 
characteristics of the job interact with age, as some jobs become more difficult to perform at 
older ages than others.  Gustman and Steinmeier (1986b) find that those holding blue collar jobs 
find them sufficiently difficult so that they retire about three years earlier than white collar 
workers, holding the wage and all other relevant factors constant.  
   4III. The Basic Retirement Model 
  Our analysis is built around a structural model of retirement and saving that we have 
introduced in previous work.   We have used the model for policy analysis, in one case 
simulating the effects of raising the Social Security early entitlement age (Gustman and 
Steinmeier, forthcoming) and in another, simulating certain proposals made by the President’s 
Commission to Strengthen Social Security (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2002).  A full description 
of the methodology in estimating the model and using it to simulate policy is found in our earlier 
work.  
The basic structural model to be used treats full retirement, partial retirement, wealth, and 
benefit claiming as outcomes.  In the basic model, the individual is assumed to maximize a utility 
function of consumption and leisure over time:         
 
















,   α, γ  <  1. 
In this equation,  T  is the maximum lifespan and  m  refers to the three survival possibilities at 
time  t  (both spouses survive, only the husband survives, and only the wife survives).  sm,t  is the 
probability of survival state   m  at time  t,   Cm,t  is consumption in real terms at time  t,  and  Lm,t  
is the amount of leisure (retirement) at time  t.
6    Lm,t  takes on a value of  0  for full-time work 
or if the husband does not survive,  1  for complete retirement, and assuming partial retirement 
involves half-time work,  0.5  for partial retirement.   ht is a term which measures the value of 
leisure relative to consumption, and is assumed to be increasing in value as the individual ages 
and finds work more difficult.  As the age variable increases over time, leisure becomes more 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
6In recognition that consumption is more valuable while both spouses are alive, the 
consumption function is adjusted so that the marginal utility for a surviving spouse is 
approximately equal to that for a couple consuming 40% more.  
   5attractive for reasons of gradually deteriorating physical capacities and similar factors, which 
eventually result in retirement.   ht  also depends on  health status and cohort, but it is important 
to note that it explicitly does not contain any binary age variables or splines in age which might 
encourage retirement at a particular age. 
   The asset accumulation over time is given by 
       Am, ,t  =  (1 + r) An, t-1 + Wm, t (1 - Lm, t) + Em, t + Bm, t - Cm, t, with  Am,t ∃ 0, 
where  Am, t  is the level of real assets at time  t  in survival state  m,   r  is the real interest rate,   
Wm, t  is the real wage rate,  Em, t  is the earnings of the spouse, and  Bm, t  is the level of Social 
Security and/or pension benefits at time  t.   The equation must hold for any legitimate transition 
between survival state m  at time  t-1  and survival state  m at time  t.   If the individual is 
working, the wage rate may depend on whether the work is full-time or part-time.  The earnings 
and pension benefits of the spouse are treated as exogenous in this paper.  The level of benefits at 
time  t  depends on the previous decisions of the individual as to when to leave full-time 
employment and when to retire fully, as well as the current survival state.  Note that this model 
does not calculate the value of accruals to Social Security and pensions directly, but the value of 
the accruals is implicit in the model because work during one period will affect the value of 
Social Security and pension benefits in later periods.  The implicit value of these accruals, of 
course, depends strongly on the time preference rate. 
  The assumption of non-negative assets, along with heterogeneous time preferences, is an 
important part of what drives this model.  Otherwise, individuals with high time preferences 
could simply borrow against their future labor income and Social Security and pension benefits 
and consume most of their lifetime income early on.  The requirement for nonnegative assets 
   6prevents this from happening, and instead such individuals are likely to consume essentially all 
of their income each period, acquiring very little in the way of savings. 
Heterogeneous Elements 
  This utility function contains three elements which are heterogeneous between different 
individuals.  They are  (1) the time preference rate  ρ  in the discount factor  e
-ρt,  (2) the value of 
leisure  ht,  and  (3) the relative attractiveness of part-time vs. full time work, as reflected in  γ.  
The interpretation of  ρ  as a heterogeneous term is fairly straightforward, but  ht  and  γ  can use 
a little more explanation. 
  The term  ht  in the model, which is the coefficient of the leisure term, is taken to be of 
the exponential form  .   β  is a coefficient vector and  X e
X t β + ε
t  is a vector of explanatory 
variables including a constant, age, health status, and cohort.   ε  is a heterogeneity term which is 
constant over time for a particular individual. It is randomly drawn from a normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance  σ2,  but  ε  is constant over time for a particular individual.  The 
idea here is that tastes for leisure (or conversely, tastes for work) vary over the population, with 
some individuals who have a high taste for leisure activities and others who do not mind work, or 
even enjoy it. 
  γ  reflects the utility value of part-time work as opposed to complete retirement.  If  γ  is 
close to unity, then full-time leisure has about half the value of half-time leisure, and the 
individual regards the utility of an hour of leisure (and the disutility of an hour of work) as about 
the same regardless of whether the work is full-time or part-time.  If   γ  is close to zero, then 
part-time leisure is almost as valuable as full-time leisure. In this case, the individual does not 
mind part-time work too much but really dislikes having to work full-time.  Rather than define a 
heterogeneous distribution over  γ,  we equivalently define the distribution over  Vp = 0.5
γ,  
   7where  Vp  is a monotonic transformation of  γ  taking on values from  0.5  to  1  and is 
proportional to the utility value of partial retirement.   For any individual,  Vp  is assumed to be a 
random draw from the truncated exponential distribution   f(Vp) =    defined on the 
interval 0.5 to 1.  If  δ  is positive, values of  V
ke
Vp δ
p toward unity will be more common, while if  δ  
is negative, values near 0.5 will be more common. 
  The model is similar in almost all respect to one we estimated in Gustman and Steinmeier 
(forthcoming a), except that there are a few more explanatory variables in the Xβ linear form 
which governs the utility of leisure, and the respondent contributes something to the moment 
matrices in a few more ages because we don’t restrict the retirement status to be simple the 
survey dates. 
  The main difference in this model and the models we have estimated before is that this 
model contains indicators of job-specific explanatory variables in the Xβ linear form.  This 
requires some modification of the leisure part of the utility term.  The way we have written the 
utility of leisure term before is  e L
β t X β.  However, now Xt takes on different values depending on 
whether we are talking about full-time jobs or partial retirement jobs.  Let these two vectors of 
the X variables be  Xft  and  Xpt.  Recall that L can take on a value of 0 for full-time work, 0.5 for 
partial retirement, and 1 for full retirement.  It is tempting to write the leisure term for the three 
retirement choices as: 
  Full-time work:  0    , since L = 0 for full-time work 
 Partial  retirement  e   , since L = 0.5 for part time work 
δ β ) 5 . 0 (
pt X
 Full  retirement   e     , since L = 1 for full retirement. 
β ft X
 
  The problem with this formulation is that the utility difference in going from partial 
retirement to full retirement is    , and this difference depends on the 
β ft X e-
δ β ) 5 . 0 ( e
pt X
   8characteristics of the full-time job, which it should not.  The solution is to realize that the way we 
have measured utility of leisure before was relative to full-time work, but what we really want to 
do is to measure it relative to full retirement.  Thus, ignoring for the moment the exponential 
terms, the utility of the three retirement states is as follows: 
 Full  retirement   1
δ = 1 
 Partial  retirement  (0.5)
 δ 
 Full-time  work 0
 δ = 0 
 




Full retirement    1 – 1 = 0 
 Partial  retirement  (0.5)
 δ – 1 
  Full-time work  0 – 1 = -1 
 
We then apply the exponentials to the partial retirement and full-time work Ld terms: 
 
 Full  retirement   0 
 Partial  retirement  e   ] 1 ) 5 . 0 [(
pt X −
δ β
 Full-time  work -  e 
β ft X
 
In this formulation, the job characteristics apply only to those utility differences between the job 
in question and full retirement.  A change in the characteristics of the partial retirement job will 
affect the utility of that job relative to both full-time work and full retirement, but will not affect 
the utility of full-time retirement relative to full-time work.  Similarly, a change in the 
characteristics of the full-time job will change the utility of the leisure (or lack thereof) in that 
job relative to partial retirement work and full retirement, but will not change the valuation of 
partial retirement leisure relative to full retirement. 
  Thus, the utility of leisure term in the utility function should be: 
 
     e   L L ( r j
Xjt δ δ β −
where j = w, p, or r (working full-time, partially retired, or fully retired) and Lj is equal to 0 for j 
= w, 0.5 for j = p, and 1 for j = r.  Note that Xjt does not have a defined value for  
   9j = r, but that does not matter since for j = r, L  is equal to zero. 
δ δ − r j L
  Since the job characteristics in the partial retirement job were not observed for most 
individuals, we assumed that the characteristics (difficulty, stress, and age discrimination) were 
no greater than the median of the characteristics or the value in the full-time job, whichever is 
less. 
IV. The Data 
  This study uses data from the first six waves of The Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 
a longitudinal survey designed to allow explicit measurement of these different constraints.  The 
survey is taken every two years, so the data cover the period 1992 through 2002.  These data 
cover 12,652 persons from households with a respondent who was 51 to 61 years old in 1992.  
The study also uses restricted, linked employer provided pension plan descriptions and Social 
Security earnings records matched with respondents in 1992.   
  Table 1 describes the derivation of the sample from the HRS.  Table 2 reports the 
distribution for the observed retirements in the sample.  The dependent retirement variable is 
based on hours of work and is described in the appendix.  The percentages retired from full-time 
work and completely retired are calculated as percentages among those respondents who had 
retirement status observations at each particular age.  The columns “retiring in year” are really 
pseudo-retirements, calculated as the difference between the percent retired at a particular age 
and the percent retired at the immediately preceding age.  From Table 2, the spike in retirements 
at age 62 is readily apparent.  The spike in retirements from full time work at age 65 is much 
smaller.  
Construction of other key variables is also reported in Appendix 1.  The appendix begins 
with a description of the construction of two variables, one reflecting job difficulty, the other job 
   10stress.  The measure of physical stress is constructed from answers given to questions about 
physical effort, lifting heavy loads and requirements for stooping, kneeling or crouching.  Mental 
stress is measured from variables indicating whether the job requires intense concentration or 
attention, more difficult things than required of the respondent than in the past, and whether the 
job involves a lot of stress.  These indices run from 0 to 9, with 9 indicating strong agreement 
with the questions indicating stress.   
  The next measure described in Appendix 1 is related to age discrimination.  It is 
constructed from the answers to questions about whether the employer gives preference to 
younger persons in promotion decisions; and whether co-workers make older workers feel they 
should retire before 65.  The constructed variable varies from 0 to 6, with 6 indicating the most 
age discrimination.   
  The three variables enter linearly into the linear form of the exponential expression which 
multiplies the utility function.  The medians of the three variables respectively are 3 (job 
difficulty), 6 (job stress) and 2 (age discrimination). 
  A fourth measure that enters into the utility function indicates, for a respondent who 
reported a condition limiting the amount of work that could be performed, the respondent’s 
employer had made no accommodation so that the respondent could continue working.  These 
questions are only asked of those who indicated a health problem.  If the respondent had a health 
problem and if the response to the accommodation question is no or left immediately, the no 
accommodation variable is set equal to 1.  Otherwise it is zero. 
  Three other variables pertain to the budget constraint.  One indicates whether the 
respondent reports being permitted to partially retire on the job held in the first wave.  If the 
answer is yes, it is assumed that the wage rate remains unchanged if the respondent partially 
   11retires.  Otherwise, there is a reduction in the wage associated both with partially retiring and 
with the loss of job tenure.  Second, if the 1992 job ended in a layoff, the wage for a new full 
time job is calculated assuming zero tenure.  Third, if a person accepts a window, the wage for 
full time work is assumed to be the wage paid on a new job with zero tenure. 
V. Empirical Estimation 
  Estimation is based on the general method of simulated moments.  Once the model is 
estimated, including the various retirement outcomes, the model will be used to examine the 
effects of various Social Security parameters.  Since we have estimates of the preferences of the 
individuals, the simulations involve changing the Social Security parameters and running the 
model.  Typically, we base estimates on random draws of parameters, and then simulate the 
model 10,000 times. 
Table 3 reports the results for the parameters of the utility function where each of the new 
measures is included.  The age, health, consumption coefficient and standard deviation of leisure 
preference are all significant and of similar orders of magnitude as in our earlier work.  As we 
found earlier, time preference is bimodally distributed.   
Table 4 uses the model to simulate retirement outcomes.  The model fits the data well.
4  
Moreover, as in our recent work, the model is capable of simulating most of the spike in 
retirements at age 62, despite the fact that there are no age dummy variables included in the 
model, and that the Social Security benefit formula is actuarially fair around age 62.  To be more 
                                                           
4 In addition to the 46 moments in the early entitlement paper, there are 5 more each for high job 
difficulty (4-9), high job stress (7-9), high age discrimination (3-6), and lack of accommodation 
to health problems at ages 55, 58, 60 , 62, and 65.  The moments of the first three job-related 
variables are measured in the last observed full-time job, since this is job that is most relevant to 
retirement.  The fourth variable is measured in the original (1992) job.  This makes for 66 
moments.  Subtracting off the number of parameters, the model has 54 degrees of freedom for 
the q statistic.  The cut-off point for the chi-square distribution at 1% is 80.3 for 54 degrees of 
freedom.  The model’s computed q-statistics are outside these bounds, but not by a large amount. 
 
   12specific, although the model understates the number retiring at ages 62 and 65, the model comes 
close to simulating the true distribution of retirements.  According to the simulations, 7.2 percent 
more of the population leaves full time work at age 62 rather than 61.  In comparison, in the raw 
data, 8.8 percent more of the population leaves fulltime work at 62 rather than 61.  So the 
simulations catch most of the retirement spike at age 62.  The model also catches an age 62 peak 
in retirements from both full and part time work out of the labor force.  However, there it finds 
the peak between age 61 to 62 represents 4.6 percent of the labor force, whereas in the raw data, 
that spike represents 7 percent of the labor force. 
VI. Job Characteristics, Preferences and Retirement Outcomes 
  In Table 3, among the newly entered measures, only the measure of age discrimination is 
significant.  In contrast to findings from reduced form studies and from structural results from 
models that assumed a perfectly operating capital market, we find that measures of difficulty of 
work, including type of job, have no important effect on retirement preferences.   
We conducted a number of experiments to validate the finding that except for evidence of 
age discrimination, job conditions are not very important in influencing retirement.   We describe 
these sensitivity tests below.  The full sets of results are available from the authors. 
The first sensitivity test excludes the no accommodation variable on the grounds that its 
estimate is fairly large, of the wrong sign, and not at all significant.  The next set includes only 
the age discrimination variable, which is the only one that is significant at the usual 5% 
significance level.  We then used these alternative specifications to simulate retirement 
outcomes.  We found as suggested by the basic significance levels, that exclusion of these 
measures has no important effect on the simulated retirement outcomes. 
   13  We also considered alternative approaches.  We considered first the no accommodation 
variable.  To see whether this negative result truly reflects what is in the data, we compared 
retirement statistics for the part of the estimation sample that reported a health problem that 
received no accommodation from the employer.  In comparing these figures to the corresponding 
figures for the complete sample, it is apparent that for many of the ages the retirement rates for 
those indicating that no accommodation was made for a health problem is actually lower than for 
the sample as a whole. 
  It is difficult to check for this, but one possibility is that the accommodation varied with 
the severity of the health problem.  Suppose that employers tend not to accommodate what they 
perceive as a minor health problem.  Such employees tend to work almost as long as those 
without health problems, then the coefficient of the “no health problem” variable could become 
negative.  Recall that this variable in essence measures the response to a health problem to which 
no accommodation is made to all health problems (since a health variable is already in the 
model). 
  The coefficient of the age discrimination variables is of the expected sign and significant, 
but the coefficient of the job stress variable is insignificant (though of the expected sign) and the 
coefficient of the job difficulty variable is negative, contrary to expectations.  To see whether the 
negative result for the job difficulty variable is the result of something in the estimation or is 
reflected in the raw data, we separate the estimation sample into two groups according to the 
level of the job difficulty variable.  The observed retirement percentages for these two groups are 
as follows:  At age 58, the retirement rates are 22.5 percent for high difficulty jobs and 24.5 
percent for low difficulty jobs.  At age 62, the retirement rates are 54.9 for high physical 
   14difficulty jobs vs. 54.7 for low difficulty jobs.  Thus, the coefficients are merely reflecting the 
patterns of the underlying data and do not seem to be artifacts of the estimation procedure. 
The estimation sample is subject to selection on a number of dimensions discussed above, 
and on top of that the job difficulty variable must be imputed for anyone who was already retired 
or partially retired as of the first survey.  To get an idea of whether these considerations are 
affecting the results, we turn to simple tabulations of the data.  Instead of job difficulty, which is 
not available for those retired in 1992, we will look at a similar variable, which is whether the 
current or last job was blue collar or white collar.  Blue collar is defined as occupation codes 5-
16, and white collar is defined as codes 1-4.  This variable is available for almost everyone in the 
sample, whether or not they were working in 1992. 
Restricting the sample to married males, and using the self-reported definition of 
retirement (which is available for almost everyone in the sample), the retirement rates by age are 
as follows 
      




55 .19  .21 
56 .25  .18 
57 .17  .22 
58 .29  .28 
59 .21  .28 
60 .33  .32 
61 .32  .41 
62 .40  .58 
63 .68  .69 
64 .50  .74 
65 .73  .83 
 
  Retirement in this table is taken to be anyone who is either partially or fully retired.  
Using an alternative of retirement to be anyone who is not working more than 30 hours per week 
and at least 1560 hours per year yields similar results. 
   15 




55 .26  .25 
56 .28  .28 
57 .23  .27 
58 .31  .35 
59 .24  .35 
60 .39  .38 
61 .34  .42 
62 .41  .61 
63 .67  .60 
64 .45  .73 
65 .62  .83 
 
   
 
Again, white collar retirement is indeed higher than blue collar retirement at age 60, although at 
earlier ages (57-59) it appears that blue collar retirement is higher. 
Even in these simple and basic tabs, there does not seem to be a clear tendency for blue 
collar workers to retire more than white collar workers until after about age 60.  However, for the 
estimation, individuals are dropped out of the sample once they start collecting social security 
disability benefits on the grounds that a disabled individual does not really have the option of 
continuing work (a justification for this can be Bound et al.).  Moreover, disability has a strong 
correlation with blue collar status. Taking disability as someone who has applied for and been 
accepted for social security benefits before the 1992 survey, and noting that “0” is no; “1” is yes, 
we get the following table: 
 
           |  
SSDI Acceptance 
Blue Collar  0  1  Total 
2136 72 2208 0 
96.74 3.26 100.00
2376 251  2627 1 
90.45 9.55 100.00
4512 323  4835 Total 
93.32 6.68 100.00
   16 
That is, 3.3% of married males who were employed in white collar jobs in their current or last 
jobs have awarded SSDI benefits, while 9.6% of similarly situated blue collar workers have. 
  Looking at married males who have not previously been awarded SSDI benefits yields 





Age 0  1 
55 .18  .11 
56 .21  .10 
57 .15  .17 
58 .25  .21 
59 .2  .22 
60 .31  .24 
61 .29  .35 
62 .4  .51 
63 .68  .67 
64 .49  .7 
65 .71  .81 
 
 
In these tables, it is very difficult to make an argument that among married males not on 
disability, blue collar workers retire earlier than white collar workers before about age 62, 
regardless of which retirement definition is used. 
  Even among married males not on disability, blue collar workers appear to have worse 
health than white collar workers.  Here we use question B1, which asks whether the respondent 
considers his health excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor.  We take poor health to be those 
who answer fair of poor.  This question was asked long before the labor force questions were 
asked in the survey and avoids some of the potential endogeneity of the “does health limit the 
amount or kind of work you can do?” question.  The relationship of health status to the blue 
   17collar status of the current or last job among married males not on disability (again “0” is no; “1” 





0 1  Total
1928 208  2136
0  90.26 9.74  100.0
0
1874 502  2376
1  78.87 21.13 100.0
0
3802 710  4512
Total  84.26 15.74 100.0
0
 
Thus, among this group 21.1% of blue collar workers said their health was fair or poor, vs. 9.4% 
of white collar workers. 
If we limit the above retirement tables to married males in good health and not on 
disability, they become 
 
Percent self-reported as 
retired 
Blue Collar 
Age 0  1 
55 .18  .11 
56 .21  .10 
57 .14  .17 
58 .25  .21 
59 .2  .22 
60 .31  .24 
61 .29  .35 
62 .4  .51 
63 .68  .67 
64 .49  .7 
65 .71  .81 
 
number of observations: 
   18Blue Collar 
Age 0  1 
55 147  140 
56 134  137 
57 131  164 
58 142  142 
59 110  131 
60 146  131 
61 128  124 
62 90  101 
63 71  63 
64 57  70 
65 42  57 
 
       
percent retired according 
to hours definition 
Blue Collar 
Age 0  1 
55 .24  .15 
56 .24  .20 
57 .20  .22 
58 .27  .27 
59 .22  .29 
60 .37  .29 
61 .31  .36 
62 .40  .54 
63 .66  .54 
64 .44  .68 
65 .61  .81 
 
 
  Using the self-reported retirement definition, it appears that blue collar workers age 60 
and below retire, if anything, less often that white collar workers.  The same argument could be 
made, though perhaps a little less forcefully, with the hours defined retirement of the last table.  
Overall, it looks difficult to make the argument that healthy married blue collar males retire any 
more frequently than white collar males.  Thus, the simple tabulations of the raw data seem to 
confirm the estimates of the effects of job difficulty on the desire to retire. 
   19  In sum, the basic results suggest that age discrimination on the job will encourage earlier 
retirement, but otherwise job characteristics have little effect on retirement outside of their 
influence on the monetary rewards to work. 
 
VII. Simulations 
  To determine the size of the effects of each of the factors examined above, as well as the 
importance of minimum hours constraints, elimination of layoffs and window plans, we use the 
model to simulate retirement outcomes under alternative conditions.  The first panel of Table 5 
presents baseline results.  The following panels present results obtained by simulating assuming 
the taste parameter or the constraint of interest is changed as indicated.
5 
All the simulations use the same time preference rates, and the same draws for the 
random variables, as are used in the base simulation.  Thus, any differences cannot be attributed 
to differences in the random draws.  All simulations are for estimates with job difficulty and job 
stress variables, but omitting the no accommodation variable from the utility function. 
  Six potential changes are analyzed: 
Age discrimination.  The age discrimination variable is lowered to the median value if it was at a 
higher level.  In addition, if an individual was in a 1992 job with above median age 
                                                           
5 In fact, for each potential change, we ran three simulations.  The first is for the complete 
sample with the indicated change.  The second is for the restricted sample for whom the change 
applies, but without the change.  This is essentially the base simulation on a restricted sample.  
The final simulation is for the restricted sample, with the change.  By comparing the first 
simulation with the base sample, the result indicates the effect of the change on the entire 
population. By comparing the last two simulations, the result indicates the effect of the change 
on the population affected by the change.  From the perspective of the Social Security 
Administration, the change for the affected population is of interest only for those policy changes 
that will have a large effect on retirements for the overall population.  Those policies that will 
have only a small effect on the overall population typically also have only a very small effect 
even on the affected population.  Consequently, the full results are reported only for the overall 
population.  We discuss the results for the affected group when the impact on the overall 
population is large enough to warrant further investigation. 
 
   20discrimination and subsequently moved to an easier job, the simulation assumes that the 
respondent could have continued on the original job.  Comparing panel 2 with panel 1 in Table 5, 
it would appear that abolishing the impact of age discrimination on individual preferences would 
reduce retirement from full time work by about one percentage point between the ages of 58 and 
62.  The precise changes are indicated in Table 6.  Roughly half the additional workers would 
come from the ranks of the partially retired, and half would postpone retiring completely.  Thus 
with a reduction in part time work, which we simulate as half time jobs, the addition to FTE 
employment would be less than one percent.  The reduction in retirements from full time work at 
earlier and later ages amounts to about half a percentage point, with most of those coming from 
partial retirement. 
No hours limits.  All individuals are assumed to be able to switch to partial retirement in their 
full-time job at half of the earnings for half of the work.  This affects all respondents except 
those in full-time jobs which began prior to age 50 and which would allow half-time work in 
those jobs.  Implicitly, this assumes that respondents could collect their full pensions at the age 
they change from full time work to part time work.  Thus the simulation assumes the policy 
change deals with one of the major issues limiting part time work, the fact that with the 
exception of contract workers, current law prohibits paying a pension to a person who continues 
to work for the firm. 
A comparison of panel 3 with panel 1 of Table 5 clearly indicates that if demand side 
changes persuaded firms to allow partial retirement at the same hourly wage as earned on the 
long term job, this would generate a major change in retirement outcomes.  The percent of the 
labor force that passed through partial retirement would increase from about three tenths to about 
two thirds.  The second panel of Table 6 reports the difference in retirement outcomes between a 
   21state where there are no constraints on partial retirement and a state where partial retirement is 
permitted.  First, when partial retirement is permitted, the fraction who are retired from full time 
work increases by 7.5 to 9.5 percentage points at each year of age between 58 and 65.  Second, 
the percent who are completely retired declines.  The difference in the number completely retired 
falls from a reduction of 4.7 percent at age 58 to a reduction of 10.5 percent at age 62.  From age 
65 through age 69, the number who are completely retired falls by 14 to 15 percentage points.  
Comparing the change in the percent completely retired from full time work with the change in 
the percent partially retired, the effect on total earnings is roughly a wash, or suggests a slight 
decline in earnings as roughly twice as many people enter partial retirement as leave full time 
work.  Since the simulation suggests twice as many hours worked in a full time job as when 
partially retired, this change suggests that work lost through acceleration of retiring from full 
time work is roughly balanced by the fact that twice as many people now work part time – half 
coming from full time work, half coming from full retirement. 
For those 65 to 69, the opportunity to work part time increases the number partially 
retired by about 20 percent of the total population.  It reduces the number working full time by 8, 
6 and 3 percentage points at ages 65, 67 and 69 respectively.  Consequently, the increase in part 
time workers is much greater than twice the decline in full time workers, suggesting 6, 9 and 10 
percentage point increases in the population at part time work at ages 65, 67, and 69; or a three to 
five percentage point increase in full time work equivalents from ages 65 to 69.  
No layoffs.  If the respondent was laid off from his 1992 job, the base simulation assumes that 
subsequent full-time work would be in a new job with zero tenure, whether or not the individual 
was subsequently observed in full-time work.  In this simulation, we assume that he could have 
continued working in that job rather than switching to a different job at zero tenure.  Partial 
   22retirement wages are assumed to be unchanged.  The results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that 
eliminating layoffs would have almost no effect on simulated retirements. 
Windows.  All windows, that is special offers to provide an additional amount or pension benefit 
to those who retired at a specified time, are eliminated.  In addition, if the individual took a 
window offer in the 1992 job, it is assumed in the base simulation that subsequent full-time work 
would have been in a new job with tenure reset to zero.  In this simulation, it is assumed that the 
individual could have continued in the job which offered the window.  The effect of eliminating 
windows is to reduce the percent retired from full time work by about half a percentage point for 
those 58, 60 and 62.  It has no effect at other ages.  The entire effect comes from reducing the 
number who are completely retired.  The change in the number partially retired is very small. 
Job difficulty.  The difficulty level in any job is reduced to the median level if the job was above 
the median level.  This applies to both the job difficulty and job stress variables.  In addition, if a 
respondent moves from a job with above median difficulty to another original full-time job, the 
simulation assumes that the respondent could have continued on the same job without the loss of 
tenure (and wages) of moving to a new job.  This implicitly assumes that the reason for the move 
was that the individual wanted an easier job.  For those ages 62 to 67, eliminating the effects of 
excess difficulty of work or stress on the job would reduce the number retired from full time 
work from 1 to 1.5 percentage points.  A bit more than half of the change comes from a 
reduction in the number who are partially retired. 
Accommodation.  If an individual left a job because he was not accommodated, this simulation 
assumes that he could have continued in the job.  Implicitly, this assumes that the 
accommodation would be made to allow the worker to stay in the job.  The overall effects of this 
variable on retirements are miniscule. 
   23VIII. Conclusions 
Minimum hours constraints, that is requirements that individual work full time or not at 
all on many jobs, are the major firm side factor affecting the course of retirements.  Perceived 
discrimination also has an effect on retirement outcomes, but its effect is much smaller.  The 
same is true for the effects of indicators of job difficulty or stress.  Reductions in the frequency 
of layoffs, reduction in the frequency that window plans are offered, and increased availability of 
accommodations to those who report work limitations would have little effect on retirement 
outcomes. 
Should minimum hours constraints be abolished, the percent of the population ages 62 to 
69 who are completely retired will decline by 10 to 15 percentage points.  The fraction in this 
age group who are working in partial retirement jobs will increase by roughly twenty percentage 
points of the population.  Were minimum hours constraints abolished, more than twice as many 
people will enter partial retirement as will leave full time work, so that total FTE employment 
would increase were minimum hours constraints eliminated.  But the change in FTE employment 
is much smaller than the increase in partial retirement employment as many individuals will 
leave full time work and enter partial retirement at younger ages than they would have in the 
presence of a minimum hours constraints.  On the other hand, because most will retire at a later 
age, postponing their complete retirement from their lifetime job as they engage in a period of 
part time work, the effect is to raise the amount of work effort among older persons.   
As individuals enter partial retirement at younger ages than they would have left full time 
work were minimum hours constraints in place, the liquidity demands on the Social Security 
system will increase as they begin to draw down their benefits at an earlier age.  However, they 
will draw fewer benefits between the time they would have fully retired from their long term job 
   24were there no minimum hours constraints, and the time they actually leave that job given the 
availability of part time employment.  The proportion of earnings subject to the earnings test will 
also be subject to conflicting forces.  The fractions of earnings exempt from the earnings test will 
increase, but the fraction of earnings beyond the reaches of the earnings test will decline.  Lastly, 
should firms relax minimum hours constraints to encourage more partial retirement by older 
individuals, this will increase the importance of regulations pertaining to withdrawals from 
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   26Appendix 1: Construction of Variables  
 
Job characteristics.  We use questions from F82 and F83 and their counterparts on later surveys.  
Since the some of the questions in the earlier surveys were dropped in later surveys, we used 
only questions which are common across surveys and which arguably reflect on the difficulty of 
a job.  In the end, there are six questions: 
 
  My job requires a lot of physical effort 
  My job requires lifting heavy loads. 
  My job requires stooping, kneeling, or crouching. 
  My job requires intense concentration or attention. 
  My job requires me to do more difficult things than it used to. 
  My job involves a lot of stress. 
 
All of these are answered on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being strong agreement and 4 being strong 
disagreement. 
 
  The responses to the questions are put through a factor analysis.  The factor loadings are 
as follows: 
 
             
Eigenvectors 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 
physEff  0.57 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.68 -0.45
heavLoad 0.58 0.00  -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 0.81
stooping  0.57 -0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.73 -0.37
Concentr  0.04 0.51 0.79 0.33 0.02 0.05
moreDiff -0.01 0.57  -0.60 0.55 -0.04 -0.02
Stress -0.04  0.64  -0.10 -0.76 0.05 -0.04
  
Note that the first factor has loadings of the first three variables with approximately equal 
weights, and the second factor has loadings of the last three variables with approximately equal 
weights.  Together these two factors explain nearly two-thirds of the variance. 
 
  Given these results, we create two new variables.  The first simply sums the first three 
variables and the second sums the last three variables.  The sums run from 3 to 12, and they are 
rescaled and reversed to run from 0 to 9, with 9 being strong agreement on all three questions.  
We name these two variables job difficulty and job stress, respectively. 
 
  The survey also contains three questions in F85 in 1992 related to age discrimination.  
These three questions are repeated in later surveys as well.  They are: 
 
  In decisions about promotion, my employer gives younger people preference over older 
people 
  My co-workers make older workers feel that they ought to retire before age 65. 
   27  My employer would let older workers move to a less demanding job with less pay if they 
wanted to. 
 
The responses to these questions are also put through a factor analysis, with the following 
loadings on the factors: 
 
Eigenvectors 
Variable  1 2 3 
emplPref 0.69 -0.12 -0.71
collPref 0.69 -0.14 0.71 
easyJob 0.18 0.98 0.01 
 
 
The first two variables are loaded onto the first factor with almost equal weight, and the third 
variable is nearly identical with the second factor.  The first factor accounts for half the variance, 
and the first two factors account for 82 percent. 
 
  Given these results, we create a single variable for age discrimination by adding the first 
two variables.  Since these variables have values from 1 to 4, with 1 being associated with the 
most discrimination, the sum thus ranges from 2 to 8, and this was rescaled and reversed to form 
a variable running from 0 to 6, with 6 corresponding to the most discrimination.  The third 
variable, which measures employer flexibility, is closely related to another variable we will 
analyze, which is whether the employer will permit the worker to reduce work to half time on the 
job.  As such, we did not enter it into the utility function directly. 
 
  The medians of these three variables are as follows: 
 
  Job  difficulty    3 
  Job  stress    6 
  Age  discrimination   2 
 
These variables are entered linearly into the linear form of the exponential expression which 
multiplies the leisure term in the utility function. 
 
  Since these questions are asked each survey, there is the possibility that there may be 
more than one answer for a particular job.  In the case of the job held in 1992, we used the last 
set of answers for that job on the premise that those values are probably most relevant to the 
decision as to whether to retire from that job.  If the respondent worked subsequently, we also 
used the last observed responses to these questions for those jobs, again on the premise that those 
responses were the most relevant to the work/retire decision. 
 
  A problem occurs in the cases where these variables have values that are missing.  
Probably relatively few individuals refused to answer them, but they were not asked of 
individuals who are not working.  This is particularly a problem if the respondent was retired in 
the first survey and stayed retired.  Simply dropping these individuals is tantamount to dropping 
   28observations based on the value of retirement, the dependent variable.  Rather than dropping, we 
impute the variables based on the distributions that we do observe. 
 
  More specifically for job difficulty, the average value depends on occupation as follows: 
 
. table occ if 0 < occ & occ <= 17, contents(mean physDiff n physDiff); 
 




1 10.18  766 
2 10.61  575 
3 9.67  440 
4 9.21  206 
5 10.67  3 
6 9.92  111 
7 7.11  37 
8 7.11  9 
9 7.60  184 
10 6.65  225 
11 7.17  292 
12 6.03  279 
13 8.07  211 
14 7.57  281 
15 7.82  372 
16 6.45  159 
17 11.17  6 
 




Definitions of industries: 
                 
001    Managerial specialty operation (003-037) 
002    Professional specialty operation and technical support (043-235) 
003    Sales (243-285) 
004    Clerical, administrative support (303-389) 
005    Service: private household, cleaning and building  services (403-407) 
006    Service: protection (413-427) 
007    Service: food preparation (433-444) 
008    Health services (445-447) 
009    Personal services (448-469) 
010    Farming, forestry, fishing (473-499) 
011    Mechanics and repair (503-549) 
012    Construction trade and extractors (553-617) 
013    Precision production (633-699) 
   29014    Operators: machine (703-799) 
015    Operators: transport, etc  (803-859) 
016    Operators: handlers, etc  (863-889) 
017    Member of Armed Forces (900) 
 
[ Note: these averages are for the original sum which ranged for 3 to 12, with 3 being the most 
difficult.  The transformed means are (12 – origmean), where origmean is the mean given 
above.]  These values are computed for males with current jobs in 1992.  In a regression where 
the observations are individuals and the dependent value is the job difficulty variable, the set of 
17 occupation dummy variables accounts for 30 percent of the variance.  The means for 
industries are much closer, and the regression using industry dummies accounts for only 14 
percent of the variance.  Moreover, the industry variables add almost nothing to the explanation 
provided by the occupation dummy variables.  In this case, for a missing job difficulty variable, 
we take the distribution of the observed job difficulty variables in the particular industry, which 
was asked in sections G and H (last and longest job) sections of the survey, and take a random 
draw from that distribution.  Note that this strategy has some potential for errors in variables 
causing the estimates of the effects to be biased toward zero, but whatever bias is probably not 
much, given that only 12 percent of the sample reported themselves as completely retired in the 
first wave of the survey (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000). 
 
  The approach of using occupation and/or industry as instruments is less successful for the 
job stress and age discrimination variables.  The combination of industry and occupation 
dummies together are able to explain only 6 percent of the variation in the job stress variable and 
only 3 percent of the age discrimination variable.  These are so low that the imputations were 
based on the observed distributions of the job stress and age discrimination variables for the 
entire sample. 
 
  In some cases, the HRS indicates that the individual left the 1992 job and took another 
job but does not provide enough information to calculate the job characteristics of that job.  In 
these cases, the characteristics of the new job are imputed by taking a random draw from the 
distribution of characteristics in new jobs, given the characteristics in the original jobs, that is 
observed for individuals for whom the characteristics of both jobs is observed. 
 
  Another variable which is entered in the utility function is a variable indicating whether, 
for a respondent that reported a condition that limited the amount of work they could do, the 
respondent’s employer had made no accommodations so that the respondent could continue to 
work.  These questions are of the form “does your employer currently do anything special to 
make it easier for you to stay at work?” (question J109) or “At the time your health started to 
limit your ability to work, did your employer do anything special to help you out so that you 
could stay at work?” (question J38 in 1992)  These types of questions follow the self reported 
health questions as to whether the respondent had any impairment or health problem that limits 
the kind or amount of paid work or work around the house that they can do.  If the respondent 
had a health problem (using the same definition we have used in the past) and if the response to 
the accommodation question is “no” or “left job immediately,” the “no accommodation” variable 
is set equal to 1.  Otherwise, it is set equal to 0.  The 0 responses cover the answers “yes”, “no 
accommodation needed”, and “self employed” responses.  Note that the “no accommodation 
   30needed” response was added in later surveys.  We are particularly interested in whether there was 
accommodation in the 1992 job or, if the individual was not working full-time in 1992, in the 
previous full-time job. 
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Total males in sample    5867 
Not married   939 4928 
Not married long term  639 4289 
Spouse interview if married  133 4156 
Career employment  497 3659 
Ambiguity about whether jobs are ss 
covered 
49 3610 
FT years unavailable in wave 3 or ss record  0 3610 
No FT earnings in ss record or self report  36 3574 
No sr earnings, and ss earnings over limit  31 3543 
Relatively large business assets  291 3252 
No Pension Provider record in last job  865 2384 
FT years unavailable for spouse       156 2231 
   32  Table 2: The distribution for the observed retirements in the sample 
 
            












Number of  
observations 
50  4.1 3.3 4.1 3.3 243 
51  0.9 0.0 5.0 3.3 361 
52  2.7 2.2 7.6 5.5 510 
53  2.0 1.1 9.7 6.6 621 
54  2.1  1.3 11.8 7.9  712 
55 3.1  2.7  14.9  10.6  801 
56 1.9  2.1  16.8  12.7  907 
57 4.0  3.2  20.8  15.9  990 
58 3.0  2.1  23.8  18.0  1064 
59 3.6  2.1  27.4  20.1  1132 
60 6.0  6.4  33.4  26.4  1121 
61 6.3  5.5  39.7  31.9  1043 
62  15.1 12.5 54.8 44.4  986 
63 5.6  3.4  60.4  47.9  909 
64 6.7  6.7  67.1  54.6  843 
65 9.1  6.7  76.2  61.3  744 
66 4.5  3.9  80.7  65.2  658 
67 2.8  2.9  83.5  68.1  565 
68 3.1  3.3  86.7  71.4  472 
69 1.7  4.6  88.4  76.0  379 
   33Table 3: Estimation of Parameters of the Utility Function with Measures of Job Conditions 
Included 
 




σε  Std. Dev. Of Epsilon  5.50 12.97 
δ0  Constant -2.89 -5.40 
δ1  Age 0.38 2.84 
β0  Constant -10.28 -157.56 
β1  Age 0.12 4.62 
β2  Health 3.34 4.08 
β3  Vintage 0.03 0.36 
β4  Job Difficulty  -0.13 -1.34 
β5  Job Stress  0.18 1.24 
β6  Age Discrimination  0.33 1.83 
β7  No Accommodation  -0.97 -0.61 
α  Consumption   -0.42 -4.53 
    
  Number  obs.   2231 
  q:   86.823 
  
Distribution of time preference rates 
 0.00 
 0.05   
 0.10   
 0.15   










   34Table 4: Simulated Retirements Based on Estimates in Complete Model From Table 3 
 












51 1.3  0.8  4.6  2.8 
52 1.4  1.0  6.0  3.8 
53 1.7  1.2  7.7  5.0 
54 2.2  1.7  9.9  6.7 
55 2.9  2.1  12.8  8.8 
56 3.1  2.4  15.9 11.2 
57 3.7  2.8  19.6 14.0 
58 4.3  3.4  23.8 17.4 
59 4.6  3.7  28.4 21.1 
60 6.7  5.4  35.1 26.5 
61 5.6  4.6  40.8 31.1 
62 12.8  9.2  53.6  40.3 
63 4.8  4.0  58.4 44.3 
64 5.2  4.6  63.6 48.9 
65 8.6  7.8  72.2 56.7 
66 5.2  5.2  77.3 61.9 
67 4.3  4.5  81.7 66.4 
68 4.2  4.6  85.8 71.0 
69 3.9  6.1  89.7 77.0 
 
Percent of simulated retirements into partial retirement:  30.0 
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Table 5: Results of Retirement Simulations from Relaxing the Indicated Factor 
(Numbers reported are in percentages) 
            
     
       
 
   
   
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
   
     











67  percent into 69
Full  Sample  Baseline partial  retirement
  Percent retired from full time  12.9 23.9 35.2 53.7 72.2 81.6  89.7 29.9
 
 
 Percent  completely  retired  8.8 17.5 26.5 40.2 56.5 66.1 76.7  















No  Age  Discrimination  
  Percent retired from full time  12.4 22.9 33.9 52.4 71.5 81.1  89.4 28.9
 
 
 Percent  completely  retired  8.6 16.9 25.8 39.7 56.3 66 76.7  

















No  Hours  Limits  
  Percent retired from full time  18.3 31.4 44.4 63.2 80.2 87.5  92.8 66.9
 
 
 Percent  completely  retired  6.4 12.8 19.6 29.7 42.4 50.8 62.9  

















No  Layoffs  
  Percent retired from full time  12.9 23.9 34.9 53.4 72.2 81.7  89.8 29.8
 
 
 Percent  completely  retired  8.8 17.7 26.3 40.1 56.6 66.2 76.9  

















No  Windows  
  Percent retired from full time  12.7 23.3 34.7 53.3 72.3 81.7  89.7 29.9
 
 
 Percent  completely  retired  8.7 17 26.2 39.9 56.5 66.2 76.8  
 Percent  partially  retired  4 6.3 8.5 13.4 15.8 15.5 12.9  
No Job Difficulty or Stress                   
  Percent retired from full time  12.4 22.9 33.9 52.2 71.1 80.7  89.2 28.6
 
 
 Percent  completely  retired  8.5 16.9 25.8 39.6 56.1 65.8 76.5  

















Accommodation  if  Necessary  
  Percent retired from full time  12.9 23.9 35.1 53.6 72.2 81.6  89.7 29.9
 
 
 Percent  completely  retired  8.8 17.4 26.5 40.2 56.5 66.1 76.7  
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Table 6: Results of Retirement Simulations from Relaxing the Indicated Factor Relative to Baseline       
(Numbers reported are in percentages) 
 
















Difference: No Age Discrimination     
  Percent retired from full time  -0.5 -1 -1.3 -1.3  -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -1  
  Percent completely retired  -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5  -0.2 -0.1 0    













Differences: No Hours Limits     
  Percent retired from full time  5.4 7.5 9.2 9.5  8 5.9 3.1 37  
  Percent completely retired  -2.4 -4.7 -6.9 -10.5  -14.1 -15.3 -13.8    












16.9    
Differences: No Layoffs     
  Percent retired from full time  0 0 -0.3 -0.3  0 0.1 0.1 -0.1  
  Percent completely retired  0 0.2 -0.2 -0.1  0.1 0.1 0.2    










0 -0.1    
Differences: No Windows     
  Percent retired from full time  -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4  0.1 0.1 0 0  
  Percent completely retired  -0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3  0 0.1 0.1    










0 -0.1    
Differences: No Job Difficulty or Stress     
  Percent retired from full time  -0.5 -1 -1.3 -1.5 -1.1 -0.9 -0.5 -1.3
  Percent completely retired  -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6  -0.4 -0.3 -0.2    













Differences: Accommodation if Necessary                   
  Percent retired from full time  0 0 -0.1 -0.1  0 0 0 0  
  Percent completely retired  0 -0.1 0 0  0 0 0    
  Percent partially retired  0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1  0 0 0    
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